Introduction
Social citizenship includes two core areas of the welfare state: social insurance and social services (Marshall, 1950) .Whereas forces driving the growth and subsequent decline of social benefits have received much interest and scrutiny in the academic literature, the development of social services has been given relatively little attention. This is evident especially in the analysis of health care systems, where comparative investigations on the drivers for institutional change are almost absent.
Partisan politics is widely believed to be closely related to the development of social citizenship, at least during the decades of welfare state expansion in the immediate post-war period. In the area of health care services analyses of partisan politics are however missing; instead focus has been on the role of economic development, demographic shifts, and the costs of medical technology.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the influence of political determinants for health care in comparative perspective. Our hypothesis is that partisan politics is of relevance for the level of health care provision, including health employment, hospital beds and medical technology. The study includes 18 longstanding welfare democracies and covers the period . The empirical analysis is based on OECD Health data 2010.
The paper continues with a discussion on the driving forces for health care provision. A section on data and methodological consideration precedes the results. The findings are discussed at the end.
Driving forces
The development of welfare states has long been a contentious issue in social science.
During the first decades after the end of the Second World War the dominating trend was to see the implementation of social policies as an evolutionary consequence of economic development, industrialization, and modernization (Kerr et al., 1960; Pampel and Williamson, 1988; Wilensky, 1975 Wilensky, , 1981 . Cross-national differences were mostly seen as depending on cultural specificities, values, or polity organization (Flora, 1986; Form, 1979; Wilensky, 1975) .
In the 1970s an alternative strand of thinking, power resource theory, emerged, especially within sociology, stressing the role of partisan politics, distributive conflicts and power relations among groups of actors within countries, in counteracting effects of seemingly similar economic and technological developments. According to this actororiented sociological perspective, in addition to several other factors, cross-national differences in welfare state development were seen significantly affected by partisan politics (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Goldthorpe, 1984; Hicks, 1999: Huber, Ragin and Stephens, 1993; Korpi, 1983 Korpi, , 1989 Korpi and Palme, 1998) .
New politics
In recent years, however, comparative welfare state research has seen a re-emergence of apolitical causes for institutional reform in the context of "post-industrialism" and "globalization". The development of modern welfare states is held to depend on a series of socio-economic factors, such as the pressures from the trans-nationalization of capital, the transition to the dominance of the service sector with ensuing lower productivity especially in the social care sector, and demographic trends with an aging population and low fertility levels. Together with slower economic growth rates, most Western governments have come to struggle with budgetary constraints, leaving no or very limited space for continued welfare state expansion. Since the obstacles for welfare state reform are assumed to be the same across countries, the solutions are consequently held to be similar. In political science it has even been argued that a new form of politics has emerged, where governments irrespective of political orientations have had to accommodate to austerity and welfare state decline (Pierson, 1996) . In this essentially structural perspective on the analysis of welfare states, partisan politics was deemed to have lost the role as a significant driver for institutional change.
We see no reason to argue against globalization, or more specifically, the transnationalization of capital movements, placing increased pressure on national polities to adapt economic and social policies. In order to stimulate business confidence on a globalized market there can be reasons for governments to reduce the welfare state, for example, by lowering taxes and social spending, in order not to be seen to distort a sound investment climate (Strange, 1996) . A widely shared understanding in the scholarly debate about the sustainability of welfare states is in fact that maintenance, let alone expansion, of social protection has to be replaced by more social investment friendly policies (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Scharpf,2002) , something that includes a reorganization, or at least recalibration, of social policy (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003; Rieger and Leibfried, 2003) . Although modified to some extent, partly parallel ideas have been expressed in politics, perhaps most explicitly by proponents of the Third Way in Britain and the Active Welfare State in Belgium, but also in the EU social inclusion process (Frazer et al., 2010) . The basic argument in these perspectives on the reorganization of the welfare state is that social endowments in terms of good infrastructure and human capital have to be developed in order to attract capital investment.
Whereas the perspectives above concentrate on the direction of the association between external structural economic factors and welfare states, there is a parallel discussion on the relative role of international versus domestic economic factors. For example, national responses to globalization may differ depending on how the relationships between economic actors are organized (Soskice, 1999) , particularly the extent to which formal institutions coordinate the interests of employers and employees (Hall and Soskice, 2001 ). According to this "varieties of capitalism" perspective employers are the main architects of institutional reform. Alternatively, social policy development has been related to the internal degree of deindustrialization and the relative increase of the service economy within countries, and not to external financial pressures caused by globalization as such (Iversen and Cusack, 2000) .
Although globalization and deindustrialization certainly are interrelated to some extent, somewhat similar ideas of a spurious relationship between globalization and the development of modern welfare states are expressed by Pierson (2001) . Indeed, the development towards service sector dominance is a common direction for most OECD countries. However, there are major differences in the composition of the service sector across countries. In the large social service sectors of the Nordic countries, for example, a dominant component is care work (Montanari, 2009 ), which traditionally is associated with slower productivity growth than the industrial sector. This regards potentially other service sub-sectors as well.
Although the gradual transition from an industrial to a service economy may have hampered economic growth, with potential negative consequences for social policy expansion in general, the link to health care development is less straightforward. Health care may in fact be considered a form of social investment, in order to improve the quality of human capital. In the European countries, at least, and contrary to the development of social benefits, there has also been a slow but steady increase in health care provision since 1980. Not only medical equipment has improved, reflecting the fast and consistent growth of the biomedical and pharmaceutical industrial sectors (Clemente et al., 2008) , but also health employment has been expanded although at a slower pace (Montanari and Nelson, 2012) . To some extent the development towards a service economy may not necessarily have been detrimental for health care provision.
Parts of the increase in health employment are probably related to demographic shifts and population aging, another proposed factor for welfare state austerity. However, it is unlikely that the demographic shift to an aging population would rule out the importance of partisan politics for health care provision. Among the OECD countries only the United States has independent strong lobby groups for retired people. In the other countries, interest formation among the elderly is to large extent tied to auxiliary organizations of political parties.
Partisan politics
The earliest attempts to explain welfare state development in terms of the distribution of power resources largely portrayed the political struggle as involving two major antagonists: organized labour and parties to the left pushing for expansive reforms, and centre and right political actors largely opposing such efforts (Korpi, 1983; Stephens, 1979) . Gradually more nuanced perspectives on these political struggles emerged, recognizing also the role of confessional parties for particular types of social policy making, involving less redistributive elements than its Social Democratic counterpart in the Nordic countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990; van Kersbergen, 1991; Huber et al., 1993) . Although the Continental European countries, where confessional parties have had strong influence on policy making, are latecomers in terms of promoting care services for children and the elderly, they seem to have been more pro-active concerning the development of health care, albeit in the form of insurance based provision rather than as universal citizenship rights (Huber et al., 1993; Wendt et al., 2009 ). There are thus theoretical reasons for expecting both left-wing and confessional cabinets to be positively associated with health care provision. Added to this partisan politics hypothesis is the segmentation of social policy associated with corporatist welfare state institutions in Continental Europe, which has been linked to European confessional parties seeking to offset the political basis for the mobilization of workers (Korpi, 2006) . Consequently we can expect confessional parties to be particularly inclined to promote high levels of health care provision when in strong competition with left parties.
Analysts have found empirical evidence of social policy variation due to partisan politics, even for the most recent decades when welfare state expansion seems to have levelled off (Korpi and Palme, 2003) . Although social insurance replacement rates (Montanari 2001; Montanari et al., 2007 Montanari et al., , 2008 and social assistance benefit levels (Nelson 2008 ) in most countries have been curtailed since the 1980s, comparative evidence also shows, contrary to common expectations, a diverging trend in the organization of social benefits (Montanari et al., 2007 (Montanari et al., , 2008 . Similar development towards increased institutional differences across countries has been observed for health care (Marmor et al., 2005; Montanari and Nelson, 2012) . Thus, countries seem to have responded in different ways to the seemingly similar exogenous pressures for welfare state reorganization, something that draws attention to endogenous political factors that may vary according to parliamentary incumbency. In connection with health care, for example, Jacobs (1998) and Hacker (2004) see ideological orientations as one supposed reasons for the continued institutional diversity of European welfare states.
In this context we must however also recognize the role of constitutionally regulated processes of decision-making for social policy making, such as constitutional veto points and voting rights (Hacker, 2004; Immergut, 1992; Huber and Stephens, 2000) . The nature of these political institutions can most fruitfully be seen as intermediate variables "with different effects on policy legislation in the presence of different political actors" (Huber et al, 1993:745) . Constitutional veto points and regional authority in social policy matters seems to be most constraining on left party incumbents in national parliaments (idem), something that may be of particular relevance for health care, which sometimes are regionally or locally organized.
Institutional dependencies
The level of health coverage and expenditure may also influence or even circumscribe the possibilities for extending provision, particularly when combined with the structural pressures for welfare state reorganization noted above. This perspective on institutional dependencies is strongly related to the wider discussion on welfare state austerity and the gradual expansion and maturation of social policies, where pensions but also health care have been used as prominent examples (Pierson, 2001) . Such interdependencies in the components of health care systems are pertinent also to the discussion on health system typologies that gradually have emerged in research (Wendt, 2009) . 1 We can easily see the relevance of arguments that health care may have grown to its limits, imposing restrictions on further expansion of health care provision. The enlargement of the medical and pharmaceutical industry has for long been a primary focus in health economics and considered an important driver for rapidly increasing health care costs (Okunade and Murthy, 2002) . In an era marked by fiscal constraints it is likely that policy makers draw attention to escalating economic costs of this kind. Likewise, it would be natural for policy makers to slow down the increase of health employment associated with relatively high unit costs. Quantitative expansion of health care may also have been limited with respect to the number of hospital beds, where we actually can see a decline over the past decades in the European countries (Montanari and Nelson, 2012) . Several European countries have partly replaced hospital care with specialized nursing care, alternatively treating patients at home with the assistance of community-based health and social care services. There are several reasons for this reorganization of health care provision, such as important changes in treatment and care options. However, additional factor are fiscal constraints and pressures for cost containment in health policy (Healy and McKee, 2002) .
There are numerous factors competing for explanatory power in terms of health care development and besides partisan politics the discussion above has focused on the role of economic development, demographic shifts, the service economy, constitutional structures and the maturation of welfare states. Below we will present the data and method. In the empirical analysis that follows we will assess the extent to which partisan politics has any effects of health care provision that goes beyond these alternative drivers for institutional change.
Data
There are major conceptual difficulties and measurement problems involved in health care research, particularly concerning the comparative analysis of health care systems (Bevan et al., 2010) . Whereas modes of governance, funding principles and service coverage are important dimensions in the ongoing discussion of health system typologies, the level of health care provision is largely a neglected field in comparative health research. In a pioneering study of health care in the OECD countries, Schieber and Poullier (1987) , for example, identified three essentially different health care systems; universal health care, social insurance based health care and private health care. This classification of countries' health care systems was largely based on the coverage, funding and ownership of the services. Less emphasis was placed on the level of service provision, despite the obvious link between levels of provision and various health outcomes, such as patients' satisfaction, healthcare utilization and individual well-being (Wendt, 2009 ).
Numerous health care resources are potential targets for the analysis of health care provision. In this study we include three areas of outmost importance for the delivery of health care citizenship rights, namely employment, beds and technology (Montanari and Nelson, 2012) 
Analytical Techniques
The empirical analyses are based on unbalanced panel data with at least 207 observations unequally divided across time and space. The number of observations for a single country is no less than five. OLS regressions based on cross-sectional panel data are likely to produce incorrect standard errors for the regression coefficients. In this study we follow common procedures to adjust for these errors by computing cluster robust standard errors of the regression coefficients (Moller et al., 2003) . The robust estimator provides correct standard errors in the presence of heteroskedastic error terms across countries, while the cluster option reports valid standard errors also in presence of within-unit correlation over time, something that includes autocorrelation. In order to control for the effects of non-included characteristics of countries we use fixed effect models. Since the full set of country dummy variables does not allow us to test the influence of time-invariant variables, we cannot use a conventional fixed effects model to control for the effect of constitutional veto points. Here we follow the strategy of Swank and Martin (2001) and include country dummies only when the associated t statistic exceeds 1.00.
Cluster robust standard errors require that there are no contemporaneous effects and correlated errors between countries. This assumption might be violated if an unmeasured factor influences the outcome for all countries at a specific point in time. Severe global financial crises of the magnitude recently experienced and beginning in 2008 is one example.
We expect such contemporaneous correlations to be less problematic here, especially since health care provision shows a steady increase in most of our countries throughout the period (Montanari and Nelson, 2012) . Although the regressions are based on pooled cross-sectional and time series data, the results are sensitive to the influence of single countries. We have therefore continuously checked for observations that deviate from the broader pattern, without observing any substantial changes to the results.
Results
The level of health care provision differs extensively across countries, ranging between standard scores of 1.57 in Germany and -1.58 in the United Kingdom. Table 1 [ Table 1 [ Table 2 about here]
The results are according to expectations. Partisan politics seem to be of importance for health care provision and both left and confessional governments have statistically significant and positive effects (model I). In order to explore the influence of electoral competition between left and confessional parties we have introduced an interaction term between the variables measuring left and confessional government strength (model II). Since the standard errors of the coefficients corresponding to the interaction term and its components are inflated due to multicollinearity, we will here test for significance using model fit rather than the precision of each single variable estimate.
2 This F-test shows that the effect of confessional governments varies according to the strength of left parties.
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The positive coefficient for the interaction terms shows that the effect of confessional governments on health care provision is stronger the more powerful left parties has been. We have estimated models where control variables are introduced for constitutional structure, economic development (GDP), service sector employment, ratio of elderly population, health care coverage and health care expenditure. Descriptive statistics for the control variables are in Appendix. The effects of government partisan composition are not influenced to any series extent by including these control variables (model III), among which only the size of the service sector has a statistically significant and positive effect on health care provision (model IV). Since health employment is one of the components included in our measure on health care provision, we have run the regressions excluding the service sector variable, without any substantial changes in results.
Next we turn to an analysis of the separate components of health care provision. Table 3 shows the results from a series of fixed effects regressions of health employment, hospital beds and medical technology on government partisan composition in 18 OECD countries 1980-2005. The same set of control variables is used as in the analysis of the health care provision index above. The number of observations is clearly lower than in the preceding analysis, something that makes it more difficult to establish statistical significant relationships. Nonetheless, both left governments and confessional governments have positive effects on health employment (model I), the influence of confessional parties becoming stronger when being in intense electoral competition with left governments (model II).
Among the control variables the size of the social service sector has once again a statistically significant and positive effect and we have therefore applied the similar type of sensitivity analysis as above.
[ Table 3] The effects of left and confessional governments change from positive to negative when the focus of analysis is shifted from health employment to hospital beds (model III).
However, only the coefficient for confessional governments is statistically significant. The interaction between left governments and confessional governments has also disappeared (model IV). Thus, in terms of the number of hospital beds, the negative effect of confessional parties is independent of the political power of left parties. Among the control variables, economic development, the relative size of the elderly population and constitutional structure is statistically related to the number of hospital beds. Economic development and the relative size of the elderly population tend to reduce the number of hospital beds, something that might be related to the substitution of hospital care with other forms of service provision noted above. The positive and statistically significant effect of constitutional structure might indicate the presence of greater degrees of path dependency in countries with veto points in their political systems, causing obstacles for major logistic health care reform of the sort described above.
Turning to medical technology, we find that the coefficients for left governments and confessional governments are positive (model V), but turns into opposing signs when the interaction term is included (model VI). However, neither the independent effects of the government partisan composition variables nor their interaction are statistically significant.
Among the control variables only health care coverage and the relative size of the elderly population have statistically significant relationships to medical technology. Whereas health care coverage has a negative coefficient and tends to reduce the level of medical technology, the relative size of the elderly population tends to increase it.
The influence of health care coverage is somewhat surprising, since there is only modest variation across countries on this dimension. Complete coverage is reached in countries where access to health care is universal, including the Nordic countries, Australia, Canada, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Countries with insurance based health care systems reach on average nearly complete coverage over the period, in part by the often gradual implementation of compulsory health insurance schemes. In this category we find several continental European countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Health care coverage is at the lowest level in the United States, where only three quarters of the population are covered by existing legislation over this period. There are several plausible explanations for this relationship between health care coverage and medical technology, one being the large-scale pooling of risks and resources that universal policy programs often are associated with. This pooling of risks and resources in health care seems to cut across countries in patterns that are somewhat different from those of the major cash benefit programs, where a distinction often is made between the social democratic, the conservative and the liberal welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990) . In terms of medical technology, it is therefore difficult to find any clear effects of political incumbency.
Discussion
The role of partisan politics for the development of social citizenship rights continues to be an important and controversial issue in comparative social science research. The empirical analysis in this paper shows than partisan politics is of relevance for the development of health care provision. Based on pooled time-series regression for 18 OECD countries 1980-2005 we find that left and confessional governments are positively associated with health care provision. The effect of confessional governments varies with the strength of left parties, being higher in countries where left and confessional parties have been in close electoral competition. Some differences between the three dimensions of health care provision were observed. Whereas partisan politics seem to be a major factor for explaining levels of health care employment and the number of hospital beds, there was no clear influence of political incumbency on medical technology. The extent to which the lack of statistical association between government partisan composition and medical technology is due to lack of observations in the original OECD health data needs to be investigated further.
The old "logic of industrialism" and "modernization" theories declared an absence of political alternatives for industrial man (Kerr et al. 1960:283) ; "globalization" theorists have equally tended to decidedly rule out political alternatives in social policy development. There seems nowadays to be only one way to follow, i.e. to let the market forces decide the allocation and distribution of economic and social resources, within and among nations. Institutional differences are in fact political differences in organizing social policy, including health care, which remains a fundamental social right, although it may also be considered a form of social investment. It has however to be remembered that social policy institutions are path-dependent only as long as there is political support for them (Korpi 2001) . They may be changed by new legislation, as well as by neglect to adapt existing structures or by implementation of competing institutions for the same purpose (Cox 1998; Hacker 2004) .
It is of interest to note that also in areas outside social policy recent studies indicate that countries supposedly exposed to similar pressures from national and trans-national sources have responded differently to such pressures in ways reflecting political governance; such studies include income inequality (Hacker and Pierson, 2010) , deregulation of telecommunications (Schmidt, 2009) 
